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Besides	 its	 devastating	 effects	 on	 the	 economy,	 the	 Great	 Recession	 fueled	 political	







Some	 recent	 studies	have	highlighted	 several	 factors	 that	might	be	behind	 these	
political	 changes,	 such	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 consolidated	 political	 parties	 (Hernández	 and	
Kriesi,	 2016)	 and	 the	 policy	 straitjacket	 and	 loss	 of	 accountability	 implied	 by	 the	
membership	 in	 the	 Euro	 area	 (Hobolt	 and	 Tilley,	 2016;	 Algan	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Without	
denying	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 explanations,	 in	 this	 paper	 we	 focus	 on	 a	 different	
story:	whether	the	political	effects	of	the	crisis	are	conditioned	by	previous	misbehavior	
of	politicians,	proxied	by	 the	exposition	 to	corruption	scandals	related	 to	 the	previous	
boom.	 Our	 contention	 is	 that	 the	 corruption	 surge	 affecting	mainstream	 parties	 gave	
voters	 a	 reason	 to	 increase	 their	 punishment	 because	 of	 the	 crisis	 and	 to	 look	 for	
alternative	parties,	providing	an	extra	boost	 to	political	 fragmentation.	One	reason	 for	
this	behavior	may	be	the	reduction	in	trust	in	political	parties	and	institutions	caused	by	
the	accumulation	of	evidence	regarding	malfeasance.	A	complementary	story	 refers	 to	
the	ability	of	voters	 to	connect	 the	evidence	of	malfeasance	with	the	causes	 leading	to	
the	crisis.	The	proliferation	of	corruption	scandals	related	to	decisions	relevant	for	the	







if	 the	 political	 changes	 caused	 by	 the	 economic	 crisis	 also	 have	 political	 roots.	
Concretely,	we	want	to	know	if	having	experienced	a	local	corruption	scandal	during	the	
previous	boom	conditions	the	political	effects	of	the	unemployment	shock.1	As	a	way	to	
capture	 the	political	changes	brought	about	by	 the	recession,	our	main	outcome	 is	 the	
change	 in	 a	 political	 fragmentation	 index	 (the	 inverse	 of	 the	 ‘Hirschman‐Herfindhal’	
index)	between	the	last	national	election	of	the	boom	period	(that	of	2008)	and	the	first	
national	election	held	after	the	end	of	the	recession	(that	of	2015).	We	also	estimate	the	
effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 on	 the	 vote	 for	 the	 two	 main	 national	 parties	
combined,	 on	 the	 vote	 for	 individual	 parties	 (incumbent	 and	main	 challenger	 parties,	
and	also	non‐mainstream	parties,	both	old	and	new),	and	on	turnout.	
We	 rely	 on	 a	 novel	 database,	which	 includes	 information	 on	 all	 local	 corruption	
scandals	 that	 broke	 out	 in	 Spain	 since	 the	 start	 of	 the	 boom,	 and	 high‐quality	
administrative	 data	 on	 municipal	 unemployment	 for	 the	 same	 period.	 Our	 empirical	
strategy	is	a	generalized	difference‐in‐difference	analysis.	We	regress	the	change	in	the	
fragmentation	 index	 between	 the	 2008	 and	 2015	 elections	 on	 the	 change	 in	
unemployment	between	 these	 two	years,	 and	on	province	and	population‐strata	 fixed	
effects.	This	means	that	our	identification	relies	on	comparing	municipalities	that	are	on	
the	same	province	and	have	a	very	similar	population	size.	We	validate	this	strategy	by	
                                                 
1	Unemployment	and	corruption	are	the	two	political	problems	that	worry	Spaniards	the	most.	
According	to	a	survey	by	the	Centro	de	Investigaciones	Sociológicas,	these	two	items	were	cited	






past	 in	 the	municipalities	 hit	 harder	 by	 the	 crisis.	However,	 once	 the	 fixed	 effects	 are	
included,	 neither	 the	 unemployment	 shock,	 nor	 corruption	 or	 its	 interaction	 with	







without	 a	 history	 of	 corruption,	 an	 increase	 of	 one	 standard	 deviation	 in	 the	
unemployment	 shock	 increased	 fragmentation	by	4.2%	of	 a	 standard	deviation	 of	 the	
outcome	variable.	In	the	case	of	municipalities	exposed	to	corruption,	this	number	goes	
up	to	19%.	Thus,	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	shock	on	fragmentation	is	around	four	
times	 larger	 in	 places	 exposed	 to	 corruption.	 We	 also	 find	 that	 the	 interaction	 of	
unemployment	and	corruption	harms	the	two	traditional	main	parties:	the	PP	(Partido	
Popular	 or	 the	People’s	 Party)	 and	 the	PSOE	 (Partido	Socialista	Obrero	Español	 or	 the	









under	which	we	might	 observe	 a	 response.	 Some	papers	 have	 already	 considered	 the	





Second,	 our	 results	 add	 to	 the	 literature	 that	 studies	 the	 political	 effects	 of	 the	
Great	 Recession	 (e.g.,	 Kriesi,	 2014;	 Hernández	 and	 Kriesi,	 2016;	 Hobolt	 and	 Tilley,	
2016).	Our	approach	 is	 complementary	 to	 the	one	used	 in	 this	 line	of	 research,	which	
relies	mostly	on	cross‐country	data.		
Third,	 our	 paper	 contributes	 to	 a	 recent,	 but	 fast‐growing,	 strand	 of	 literature	
studying	 the	 impact	 of	 economic	 shocks	 on	 political	 fragmentation	 and	 polarization	
(Mian	et	al.,	2014;	Funke	et	al.,	2016;	Dal	Bó	et	al.,	2018),	and	on	the	rise	of	populism	
(Guiso	et	al.,	2018a	and	2018b;	Algan	et	al.,	2017;	also	see	Margalit,	2019a,	for	a	review).	
However,	 our	 story	 here	 is	 less	 about	 which	 specific	 type	 of	 party	 people	 want	 than	




(Ferraz	 and	 Finan,	 2008;	 Costas‐Pérez	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Chong	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Our	 paper	 is	
concerned	with	how	local	corruption	affects	the	performance	of	the	party	implicated	in	
                                                 
2	Concurrent	work	by	Fernández‐Albertos	and	Kuo	(2018)	studies	the	effect	of	unemployment	
on	the	share	of	the	vote	captured	by	Podemos.	Other	works	that	have	focused	on	the	emergence	



















long‐lasting.	 It	was	also	 followed	by	a	political	 crisis,	 involving	 the	collapse	of	 trust	 in	
democratic	 institutions,	 and	 the	 fallout	 of	 traditional	 parties	 and	 emergence	 of	 new	
parties.	The	crisis	was	also	accompanied	by	a	surge	 in	political	scandals	related	to	the	

















the	 stronger	 reaction	 against	 the	 government	 and	 the	 political	 elites	 in	 general	 took	
some	time	to	occur.	
Political	 crisis.	 In	 Spain,	 parliamentary	 elections	 are	 held	 every	 four	 years.	 Parties	
present	closed	lists	and	voters	choose	the	party	they	want	to	support,	their	votes	being	
allocated	 to	 seats	 using	 the	 d’Hondt	 rule	with	 a	 threshold.	 Parliament	 comprises	 350	
seats	 and	 the	 electoral	 districts	 are	 the	 provinces.	 Representatives	 subsequently	 elect	
the	 prime	 minister	 by	 simple	 majority	 and	 the	 prime	 minister,	 in	 turn,	 decides	 the	
composition	 of	 the	 government.	 Although	 Spain	 is	 a	 multi‐party	 system,	 traditionally	
there	have	been	 two	main	parties,	 the	PP	 and	 the	PSOE.	The	PSOE	was	 the	 incumbent	
during	the	first	dip	of	the	recession;	and	was	reelected	in	the	2008	election.	The	PP	got	
in	 the	 national	 government	 after	 the	 2011	 election,	 just	 after	 the	 second	 dip	 of	 the	
recession	started;	this	was	the	party	in	charge	of	implementing	the	fiscal	adjustment	and	
reform	packages.	The	reduction	in	the	vote	share	obtained	by	these	two	parties	has	been	
                                                 
3	 The	 intensity	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 in	 Spain	 and	 the	 adjustment	 to	 it	 through	 employment	
destruction	are	attributable	to	various	factors.	First,	the	bursting	of	the	country’s	massive	real	
estate	bubble	in	the	financial	crisis	destroyed	jobs	in	the	construction	industry	and	associated	





considerable:	 from	82%	 in	 the	 2008	national	 election	 to	 73%	 in	2011	 and	 to	 52%	 in	
2015.	 Until	 these	 elections,	 Spain	 had	 only	 had	 absolute	 majority	 governments	 or	
minority	 governments	 with	 the	 support	 of	 regionally	 based	 parties.	 Traditionally,	 a	







the	austerity	measures	passed	 in	 response	 to	 the	economic	crisis	and	against	political	
corruption.	The	party	first	stood	for	a	general	election	in	2015,	winning	42	seats	and	a	
vote	 share	 of	 13%.	 Meanwhile,	 Ciudadanos	 had	 been	 founded	 earlier,	 in	 2006,	 in	
Catalonia,	 and	 had	 first	 stood	 at	 the	 2008	 general	 election	 (but	 failed	 to	win	 a	 single	
seat).	They	opted	not	to	stand	at	the	2011	election,	but	in	2015	they	won	40	seats	and	a	
vote	share	of	14%.	Electoral	fragmentation,	measured	as	the	effective	number	of	parties,	
increased	 from	 2.7	 before	 the	 crisis	 to	 3.3	 in	 the	 2011	 election	 and	 5.4	 in	 the	 2015	
election.		
2.2.	Political	corruption	




the	 public,	 the	 media,	 and	 the	 judiciary	 remained	 especially	 sensitive	 to	 corruption	
throughout	 the	 crisis	 years.	 As	 a	 result,	 more	 than	 300	 additional	 scandals	 (many	 of	
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them	 associated	 with	 instances	 of	 corruption	 perpetrated	 during	 the	 boom)	 were	
reported	 during	 the	 crisis.	Most	 of	 these	 scandals	 involved	 local	 politicians	 accepting	






prominent	 think‐tank	 entitled	 its	 annual	 report	 “The	 erosion	 of	 confidence	 and	well‐
being.	Against	citizens’	disaffection”	(Fundación	Alternativas,	2010).	The	report	warned	
of	the	possible	long‐term	effects	of	corruption	on	trust	in	government	and	the	legitimacy	
of	democracy.	According	 to	Eurobarometer	data,	 Spain,	 together	with	Greece,	was	 the	
European	country	that	recorded	the	sharpest	fall	in	satisfaction	with	democracy	during	
the	 crisis	 (Armingeon	and	Guthmann,	 2014).	Recent	 research	 substantiates	 this	 story,	
showing	that	fragmentation	(of	the	city	council)	is	a	powerful	mediator	of	the	long‐run	
effects	of	corruption	on	trust	(Solé‐Ollé	and	Sorribas‐Navarro,	2018).		
As	 Figure	 1	 shows,	 50%	 of	 the	 population	mentioned	 corruption	 among	 Spain’s	
three	 main	 problems	 in	 2015,	 according	 to	 a	 survey	 conducted	 by	 the	 Centro	 de	
Investigaciones	Sociológicas.	Interestingly,	until	2009,	corruption	had	been	perceived	as	
a	 problem	 by	 no	 more	 than	 1%	 of	 the	 population.	 This	 means	 that	 concerns	 about	







Voters	 might	 react	 to	 economic	 hardship	 in	 different	 ways.	 First,	 as	 posited	 by	 the	
economic	voting	literature,	the	most	natural	way	for	voters	to	express	a	grievance	is	by	
voting	 the	 incumbent	 out	 of	 office	 (Lewis‐Beck	 and	 Paldam,	 2000;	 Lewis‐Beck	 and	
Stegmaier,	2007;	Duch	and	Stevenson,	2008).	The	existing	empirical	evidence	suggests	
that	 in	normal	circumstances	this	 is	 followed	by	a	concomitant	 increase	 in	support	 for	
the	main	opposition	party.	Circumstances	during	the	Great	Recession,	however,	were	far	
from	normal.	The	economic	slump	was	so	entrenched	that	voters	were	left	believing	that	
none	 of	 the	 mainstream	 parties	 was	 capable	 of	 addressing	 the	 problems.	 In	 such	 a	
situation,	seeking	to	punish	the	incumbent	may	not,	 in	fact,	result	 in	an	increased	vote	
share	 for	 the	 traditional	 opposition	parties,	 as	 voters	might	 opt	 to	 support	 challenger	
parties	 (Hernández	 and	 Kriesi,	 2016;	 Hobolt	 and	 Tilley,	 2016)	 or	 to	 abstain	 (Rowe,	
2015;	Häusermann	et	al.,	2017).	There	is	a	growing	literature	providing	evidence	that,	in	
situations	of	severe	crisis,	voters	may	turn	to	less	established	political	parties,	because	
they	 are	 not	 seen	 as	 being	 responsible	 for	 the	 situation	 and/or	 because	 they	propose	
new	(not	necessarily	effective)	ways	of	handling	the	problem.4		
Of	course,	for	this	to	happen,	there	should	also	be	viable	alternatives	for	which	to	
vote	 (besides	 the	 mainstream	 parties).	 This	 was	 maybe	 not	 the	 case	 during	 the	 first	
stages	 of	 the	 crisis.	 In	 such	 a	 situation,	 voters	 may	 react	 to	 the	 discontent	 with	
mainstream	parties	in	other	ways.	For	instance,	instead	than	voting	for	new	parties	they	









on	 turnout	does	not	provide	any	 clear	prediction	on	 the	direction	of	 this	 effect.	 Some	
authors	 do	 find	 that	 unemployment	 might	 actually	 foster	 voter	 abstention	 during	
economic	crisis,	because	voters	see	governments	too	constrained	and	unable	to	respond	





For	example,	 low	 levels	of	 trust	 in	political	parties	and	government	 institutions	might	
diminish	the	intensity	of	economic	voting	(Duch,	2001).	Lack	of	trust	in	political	parties	
means	that	voters	expect	a	relatively	high	level	of	shirking	or	rent‐seeking	from	public	




Of	course,	 this	may	apply	 to	established	or	mainstream	parties	but	not	 to	new	parties	
that	emerge	during	crises	trying	to	convince	voters	that	they	are	different.	This	is	why	in	
low‐trust	 contexts	we	may	 observe	 either	 low	 economic	 or	 high	 economic	 voting	 but	
high	 fragmentation	 and	 maybe	 also	 low	 turnout	 (with	 the	 caveats	 introduced	 in	 the	
section	above).		
The	exposition	to	corruption	scandals	in	the	years	previous	to	the	crisis	may	have	
had	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 level	 of	 trust	 in	 politicians	 and	 government	 institutions	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 crisis.	 Voters	 in	 places	 exposed	 to	 corruption	 scandals	might	 be	 less	




when	 a	 municipality	 is	 hit	 by	 an	 adverse	 economic	 shock,	 the	 turn	 towards	 non‐
mainstream	parties	will	be	larger	if	it	has	been	exposed	to	political	corruption.		




public	 corruption.	 There	 is	 abundant	 anecdotal	 evidence	 of	 the	 role	 of	 this	 type	 of	
behavior	 in	 the	 generation	 of	 the	 Great	 Depression	 (Galbraith,	 1955)	 and	 also	 in	 the	
more	 recent	 recession	 (Mian	 et	 al.,	 2010	 and	 2013).	 Moreover,	 Herrera	 et	 al.	 (2020)	
show	 that	 crises	 might	 originate	 in	 political	 booms,	 that	 is,	 in	 artificially	 generated	
booms	that	boost	the	popularity	of	the	incumbent.	All	of	this	is	particularly	true	in	Spain,	
where	 the	 crisis	 was	 related	 to	 the	 growth	 and	 burst	 of	 the	 housing	 bubble.	 Both	
mainstream	 parties	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 design	 of	 policies	 related	 to	 the	 real	 estate	
sector.	Both	had	 run	 regional	 and	 local	 governments,	 and	 so	were	 responsible	 for	 the	
expansive	land	use	policies	and	of	the	lax	lending	standards	of	saving	banks	(Fernández‐
Villaverde	et	al.,	2013),	and	ultimately	for	the	recession	that	followed.	
However,	 since	 the	 crisis	 also	 had	 a	 global	 origin,	 voters	 had	 a	 hard	 time	









However,	 for	 this	 to	 happen,	 corruption	 must	 have	 two	 characteristics.	 First,	
voters	 must	 be	 able	 to	 associate	 it	 to	 political	 parties	 rather	 than	 to	 individual	
candidates.	That	is,	in	the	case	of	local	corruption	scandals,	the	effects	must	spill	over	to	
co‐partisans	at	higher	offices.	This	might	be	 the	 case	 in	Spain,	 since	 some	of	 the	most	
prominent	corruption	scandals	started	at	the	local	level	but	eventually	affected	regional	
and	national	politicians	of	the	same	party.	Also,	 it	has	been	commonplace	that	the	two	
mainstream	 parties	 use	 the	 local	 corruption	 scandals	 affecting	 the	 competitor	 as	 a	
political	weapon,	and	 irrespective	of	whether	they	can	be	substantiated	or	not.	Recent	





lower	 in	municipalities	with	 corruption	 scandals	 irrespective	 of	whether	 the	 scandals	
broke	at	 the	beginning	or	at	 the	end	of	 the	period.5	The	authors	 suggest	 this	 is	partly	
because	 attitudes	 themselves	 are	 persistent,	 and	 partly	 because	 corruption	 scandals	






                                                 
5	Aassve	et	al.	 (2019)	show	even	more	persistent	effects	of	corruption:	using	 Italian	data	 they	







2017).	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 voters’	 knowledge	 about	 the	 government’s	
macroeconomic	 performance	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 economic	 conditions	 of	 people	
considered	similar	to	them	and	who	live	in	close	vicinity.	For	example,	Ansolabehere	et	
al.	 (2014)	 show	 that	 US	 voters	 rely	 on	 information	 about	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 state	
economy	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	the	federal	government.	More	recently,	Alt	et	
al.	 (2018)	 show	 that	 the	 evaluation	of	 the	 state	 of	 the	 economy	 is	 determined	by	 the	
employment	situation	of	relatives	and	co‐workers	who	live	or	work	nearby.	In	the	case	
of	corruption,	we	can	also	expect	voters	to	be	both	better	informed	and	more	concerned	




ones	 constituting	 our	 sample)	 and	 50	 provinces,	 which	 coincide	 with	 the	 electoral	
districts	 used	 at	 the	 national	 legislative	 elections.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 section,	
exploiting	within‐province	variation	is	key	for	identification,	which	means	that	we	have	
to	use	units	that	are	smaller	than	the	province.	We	believe	the	municipality	is	the	right	
unit	 to	 study	 the	 effects	 of	 corruption,	 since	 the	 cases	 in	 our	 database	 refer	 to	
accusations	 made	 against	 local	 politicians.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 unemployment	 shock,	
information	at	the	level	of	the	municipality	is	especially	relevant	as	it	informs	us	about	
the	 effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 on	neighbors,	 relatives,	 and	 friends.	However,	 the	municipality	
might	 not	 capture	 the	 full	 effects	 of	 shocks	 to	 employment	 prospects,	 which	 may	




Census	 (Boix	 and	 Galleto,	 2004).	 There	 is	 a	 total	 of	 806	 LLMs	 covering	 the	whole	 of	
Spain.		
4.2.	Empirical	specification	
Baseline	equation	and	 identification.	We	estimate	the	 impact	of	 the	unemployment	
shock	 experienced	 during	 the	 Great	 Recession	 on	 political	 fragmentation	 (and	 other	
political	 outcomes)	 using	 the	 following	 ‘generalized’	 difference‐in‐difference	
specification:	
																														Δ =	 	Δ 	+	 ,																					(1)	
where	Δ 	 is	 the	 increase	 in	 political	 fragmentation	 in	 municipality	 i	
during	the	recession	period	(i.e.,	from	the	last	national	election	held	during	the	boom,	in	
2008,	 to	 the	 first	 national	 election	 held	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 recession,	 in	 2015),	
and	Δ 	 is	 the	 increase	 in	 unemployment	 in	 the	 same	 period.	 The	 vector	
	includes	control	variables	 in	 levels	measured	as	of	2008	(or	earlier)	and	 		and	 	
are	province	and	population	strata	fixed	effects.	The	 	coefficient	captures	the	effect	of	
an	 increase	 in	 the	 treatment	 intensity	 (i.e.,	 an	 increase	 in	 unemployment)	 on	
fragmentation.6	
Regarding	 the	 period	 of	 analysis,	we	 focus	 on	 the	 2015	 election	 because,	 as	we	
explained	 in	 Section	 2, the	 social	 reaction	 against	 the	 political	 management	 of	 the	
crisis—including	 the	 protest	 movements	 and	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 new	 parties—
happened	relatively	late	in	time,	clearly	after	the	second	dip	of	the	recession.	However,	
in	complementary	analysis,	we	also	present	results	for	the	2011	election.	
                                                 




In	 terms	 of	 identification,	 the	 fundamental	 challenge	 is	 that	 places	 subject	 to	
larger	 unemployment	 shocks	might	 have	 been	 on	 different	 trends	 prior	 to	 the	 Great	
Recession.	In	fact,	pre‐trend	analyses	in	a	‘pure’	difference‐in‐difference	estimation	(i.e.,	





We	define	five	population	strata:	 less	 than	5	thousand	 inhabitants,	 from	5	to	10,	
from	10	to	20,	from	20	to	50,	and	more	than	50	thousand.	The	fixed	effects	account	for	
the	 fact	 that	 both	 the	 economic	 impact	 of	 the	 crisis	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 corruption	
epidemics	were	spatially	clustered	and	might	have	had	quite	a	distinct	effect	on	urban	
and	rural	municipalities.	For	 instance,	some	provinces	are	more	heavily	specialized	in	
construction	 and/or	 in	 industrial	 sectors	 that	 supply	 to	 that	 sector.	 Also,	 provinces	
capture	 quite	 well	 the	 extent	 of	 provincial	 media	 markets	 and	 spatial	 differences	 in	
cultural	 and	 social	 traits.	 Moreover,	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 price	 of	 a	 seat	 from	 one	
province	 to	 another	may	have	 an	 effect	 on	 the	probability	 of	 success	 of	 small	 parties	
and,	thus,	on	their	decision	to	stand	and	on	their	campaigning	effort.	The	same	applies	
to	 population	 size,	 because	 some	 of	 the	 drivers	 of	 political	 discontent	 are	 more	
prevalent	in	large	cities	(e.g.,	the	real	estate	crisis).	Therefore,	we	identify	the	effects	of	
the	 rise	 in	unemployment	by	 relying	solely	on	within‐province	and	within‐population	
strata	variation.		
We	also	 add	 a	bunch	of	 pre‐treatment	 covariates	 in	 levels	 included	 in	 .	 These	
comprise	 political	 (fragmentation,	 voter	 turnout	 and	 parties’	 vote	 shares	 at	 the	 2008	
election),	 socio‐demographic	 (the	 mean	 age	 of	 the	 population,	 and	 percentages	 of	
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people	 with	 college	 education	 and	 of	 immigrants),	 and	 economic	 variables	 (the	
unemployment	 rate,	 housing	 prices,	 and	 municipal	 expenditures).	 These	 covariates	
account	 for	the	possibility	that	the	aggregate	effects	of	 the	crisis	have	different	effects	
depending	on	the	individual	traits	of	voters	and/or	the	economic	environment	in	each	





effects	 are	 included,	 political	 fragmentation	 evolved	 in	 a	 similar	 way	 in	 the	 past	 in	
places	 hit	 by	 high	 vs.	 low	 shocks	 during	 the	 Great	 Recession.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 the	
different	sets	of	controls	in	levels	does	not	affect	at	all	our	results.		
That	 there	are	no	differential	pre‐trends	 in	 the	pre‐treatment	years	bolsters	 the	
validity	of	the	empirical	approach.	Notice,	however,	that	it	is	still	possible	that	there	are	





generated	 an	 important	 wealth	 loss	 on	 homeowners,	 which	may	 be	 captured	 by	 the	
drop	experienced	by	housing	prices.	The	crisis	also	generated	a	 collapse	 in	municipal	
expenditures	 in	 places	 where	 the	 budget	 was	 funded	 disproportionately	 with	
construction‐related	 revenues	 (Solé‐Ollé	 and	 Viladecans‐Marsal,	 2019).	 Finally,	
municipalities	hit	harder	by	the	crisis	might	also	have	experienced	more	outmigration	
or	 at	 least	 a	 slowdown	 of	 immigration	 flows.	 All	 these	 changes	 might	 potentially	
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confound	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 shock.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 results	 also	 remain	
unchanged	 after	 including	 these	 controls	 in	 the	 equation,	 which	 increases	 our	
confidence	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 unemployment	 genuinely	 captures	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
crisis	on	household	economies.		
Heterogeneity.	 To	 study	 whether	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 on	
fragmentation	 is	 amplified	 by	 the	 prior	 experience	 of	 corruption	 we	 estimate	 the	
following	equation:	
		Δ =	 Δ 	 	 	Δ ∗
																																																																											 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ,											(2)	
where	 	 is	 a	dummy	variable	 equal	 to	one	 if	municipality	 i	 experienced	at	
least	 one	 corruption	 scandal	 related	 to	 a	 local	 politician	 belonging	 to	 a	 mainstream	
party	(i.e.,	either	the	PSOE	or	the	PP)	during	the	boom	years	(i.e.,	1999‐2007).	We	think	
these	 are	 the	 cases	 that	 fit	 better	 the	 story	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 punishment	 of	
mainstream	parties	because	of	 the	 crisis	was	 related	 to	 a	prior	history	of	 corruption.	
Note	that	some	of	these	municipalities	may	have	also	experienced	a	corruption	scandal	




Regarding	 interpretation,	 notice	 that	 the	 	coefficient	 in	 equation	 (2)	 measures	
the	impact	of	the	unemployment	shock	on	fragmentation	in	places	that	did	not	have	an	
experience	 with	 corruption,	 while	 	+		 		 is	 a	 measure	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	






than	 equation	 (1).	 For	 instance,	 we	 also	 assume	 here	 that,	 before	 the	 crisis,	
fragmentation	 was	 on	 the	 same	 path	 in	 municipalities	 affected	 and	 unaffected	 by	
corruption	 scandals.	 Since	 these	 corruption	 scandals	 break	 out	 during	 the	 boom,	 it	
could	have	happened	that	fragmentation	already	started	to	growth	then.	This	would	not	
necessarily	 invalidate	 our	 analysis	 but	 would	 affect	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 results.	
More	problematic	would	be	to	find	that	fragmentation	evolves	differently	in	corrupt	and	
non‐corrupt	municipalities	even	before	 the	boom.	Fortunately,	we	are	able	 to	discard	
this	 possibility,	 showing	 that	 fragmentation	 in	 these	 two	 types	 of	 municipalities	 did	
follow	the	same	evolution	over	time.	This	also	happens	for	the	interaction	between	the	
unemployment	 shock	 and	 corruption.	 Among	 municipalities	 without	 a	 history	 of	
corruption,	 the	 evolution	 of	 fragmentation	 (during	 and	 before	 the	 boom)	 is	 similar	
irrespective	of	 the	 size	of	 the	unemployment	 shock.	The	 same	happens	 in	 the	 case	of	
corrupt	municipalities.		
However,	the	estimation	of	the	interaction	coefficient	 	faces	one	added	difficulty.	
Even	 if	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 unemployment	 shocks	 in	 non‐corrupt	 and	 corrupt	
municipalities	(i.e.,	 	and	 	+		 ,	respectively)	are	well	identified,	it	is	not	clear	that	the	
difference	 between	 them	 (i.e.,	 )	 tells	 us	 only	 about	 the	 effect	 of	 corruption	 on	 the	
                                                 
7 Although	this	is	the	main	purpose	of	the	paper,	the	results	from	the	estimation	of	equation	(2)	
also	 allow	 us	 to	 recover	 other	 interesting	 parameters.	 For	 example,	 provided	 that	
Δ 	is	demeaned,	the	coefficient	 	can	be	interpreted	as	the	impact	of	corruption	in	
a	municipality	 hit	 by	 the	mean	 unemployment	 shock.	 Also,	 the	marginal	 effect	 	 	 can	 be	






by	 other	 factors	 rather	 than	 the	 exposition	 to	 corruption	 scandals.	 To	 deal	with	 this	
issue,	 we	 assess	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 results	 to	 adding	 interactions	 between	 the	
unemployment	shock	and	possible	confounders	of	corruption:	political	 fragmentation,	
electoral	 volatility,	 turnout,	 and	 a	 left‐right	 ideology	 index,	 all	 of	 them	 computed	 as	
historical	 averages	 (i.e.,	 over	 all	 the	 elections	 prior	 to	 the	 boom).	 These	 political	
variables	 account	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 corruption	 might	 be	 higher	 in	 places	 with	
historically	 low	turnout,	with	right‐leaning	voters,	and	with	 low	electoral	competition	
(see	Solé‐Ollé	and	Viladecans‐Marsal,	2012,	and	Solé‐Ollé	and	Sorribas‐Navarro,	2018,	
for	 evidence).	 In	 an	 even	 more	 demanding	 specification,	 we	 control	 for	 a	 full	 set	 of	
interactions	 between	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 and	 provincial	 fixed	 effects,	 thus	
estimating	 the	 interaction	 effect	 using	 only	 within‐province	 variation.	 It	 is	 certainly	
reassuring	that	the	estimate	of	the	compounded	effect	of	unemployment	and	corruption	
is	robust	to	the	inclusion	of	all	interactions.	
Estimation	 and	 inference.	 The	 above	 equations	 are	 estimated	 by	 ordinary	 least	
squares.	To	avoid	our	results	being	influenced	by	a	myriad	of	small	municipalities,	we	
drop	 those	 with	 fewer	 than	 1,000	 residents.	 We	 also	 exclude	 from	 our	 analysis	
municipalities	 from	 two	 regions	 (Catalonia	 and	 the	 Basque	 Country)	 that	 have	
traditionally	had	a	significantly	different	political	scenario.	In	these	regions,	due	to	the	










Political	 outcomes.	 The	 main	 political	 outcome	 studied	 is	 a	 fragmentation	 index	
(Fragmentation)	computed	using	vote	data	from	national	elections	at	 the	municipality	
level.	We	 use	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	 Hirschman‐Herfindahl	 index,	 giving	 us	 the	 ‘effective	
number	 of	 parties’.10	 Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 evolution	 of	 this	 index	 between	 2000	 and	
2015.	Several	 trends	should	be	highlighted.	First,	 the	graph	shows	a	small	 increase	 in	
fragmentation	 between	 the	 2008	 and	 2011	 elections	 (with	 the	 ‘effective	 number	 of	
parties’	 increasing	 from	2.33	 to	 2.45),	 and	 a	 large	 spike	 between	 the	 2011	 and	 2015	
elections	 (from	 2.45	 to	 3.81).	 Second,	 this	 increase	 ran	 parallel	 to	 the	 increase	 in	
unemployment.	The	unemployment	 rate	 jumped	 from	around	5%	 in	2008	 to	 close	 to	
12%	 in	 2011	 and	 at	 around	 13%	 in	 2015.11	 Finally,	 neither	 unemployment	 nor	
fragmentation	changed	much	between	the	2000	and	2008	elections.	
                                                 












We	also	 study	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 vote	 for	 the	 two	mainstream	parties	 together	
(%Vote	main	parties)	and	also	the	vote	for	specific	parties,	either	the	two	main	parties	
(%Vote	incumbent,	%Vote	challenger)	or	each	of	the	non‐mainstream	parties,	either	the	
new	 parties	 (Podemos	 or	 Ciudadanos)	 or	 the	 old	 ones	 (Izquierda	 Unida,	 the	 former	
communist	party,	 and	other	minor	parties	grouped	 together).	 Finally,	we	also	 look	at	
the	 effects	 on	 turnout.	 The	 data	 on	 votes	 to	 parties	 at	 national	 elections	 at	 the	
municipality	level	are	from	the	Spanish	Ministry	of	Home	Office.12	
Unemployment.	 The	 unemployment	 rate	 is	measured	 as	 the	 number	 of	 unemployed	
people	in	the	municipality	averaged	over	the	12	months	of	the	year,	over	the	working	
age	 population.	 The	 unemployment	 shock	 (∆%Unemployed)	 is	 computed	 as	 the	
difference	in	the	unemployment	rate	between	the	election	years,	i.e.,	from	2008	to	2015.	
The	source	of	this	variable	is	the	Spanish	Ministry	of	Employment.	The	quality	of	these	
data	 is	 very	 high	 on	 international	 standards.	 Notice	 that	 we	 are	 working	 with	
administrative	 data	 with	 census	 characteristics,	 something	 that	 contrasts	 with	 many	
indicators	used	in	the	literature	which	are	based	on	estimates	of	economic	activity	and	
are	 thus	 prone	 to	 measurement	 error	 (see	 Healy	 and	 Lenz,	 2017,	 for	 a	 further	
discussion	of	the	advantages	of	using	this	type	of	data).		
Corruption.	 To	 measure	 the	 history	 of	 corruption	 we	 use	 a	 dummy	 variable	
(Corruption)	which	 is	 equal	 to	one	 if	 the	municipality	experienced	(at	 least)	one	 local	
corruption	scandal	prior	 to	 the	crisis	(i.e.	 from	2000	to	2008)	that	affected	one	of	 the	
main	 parties	 (PSOE	 or	 PP).13	 The	 source	 of	 these	 data	 is	 an	 updated	 version	 of	 the	
database	employed	by	Solé‐Ollé	and	Sorribas‐Navarro	(2018).	The	authors	started	with	
                                                 
12	See	Table	A1	in	the	Online	Appendix	for	the	summary	statistics	of	all	variables.	






updated	 and	 improved	 this	 database	 using	 Factiva.	 We	 screened	 the	 period	 from	
January	1995	to	January	2015	using	as	our	keywords	‘corruption’	and	the	names	of	all	








of	 publication	 of	 the	 first	 news	 story	 and	 also	 regarding	 the	 period	 of	 time	 in	which	
corruption	 activities	 presumably	 took	 place.	 This	 means	 that	 we	 are	 able	 to	 divide	
corruption	cases	into	scandals	that	broke	out	during	the	boom	and	scandals	that—even	
though	might	refer	to	episodes	that	happened	in	the	boom—broke	out	during	the	crisis.		
Control	 variables.	 Data	 for	 the	 socio‐demographic	 variables	 Mean	 Age	 and	
%Immigrants	are	from	the	local	registry	data.	The	information	comes	from	the	Spanish	
National	 Institute	 of	 Statistics	 (INE).	%College	 educated	 comes	 from	 census	 data.	 The	
last	 census	 before	 the	 treatment	period	begins	 (2008)	was	 the	2001,	 so	 this	 variable	
refers	 to	 that	 year.	Housing	prices	 is	measured	 as	 the	 selling	 price	 of	 new	 houses,	 in	






between	 unemployment	 and	 possible	 confounders	 of	 corruption.	 Specifically,	 we	
consider	historical	 fragmentation,	 turnout,	electoral	volatility,	and	 ideology,	computed	
as	averages	using	data	for	elections	prior	to	treatment	(that	is,	from	1983	to	2004).	The	
volatility	measure	is	the	Pedersen	index	(Pedersen,	1979),	computed	by	multiplying	by	
½	the	sum	of	 the	absolute	value	of	 the	change	 in	vote	shares	of	all	 the	parties	 in	 two	





As	 a	 first	 step,	 we	 estimate	 the	 average	 effect	 of	 the	 local	 unemployment	 shock	
experienced	 during	 the	 period	 2008‐15	 on	 the	 change	 in	 fragmentation	 during	 this	
period,	without	taking	 into	account	the	history	of	corruption	of	each	municipality.	We	
estimate	 the	 generalized	 difference‐in‐difference	 specification	 given	 by	 equation	 (1),	
which	 includes	 province	 and	 population	 strata	 fixed	 effects,	 and	 also	 pre‐treatment	
political,	 socio‐demographic,	 and	 economic	 controls:	 fragmentation,	 vote	 shares	 and	











dependent	 variable	 (which	 is	 0.54).	 The	 effect	 is	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	 1%	
level.15	
Columns	(2)‐(5)	of	Table	1	show	the	estimates	for	several	pre‐trend	placebo	tests.	
The	 year	 above	 each	 column	 tells	 us	 that	 we	 are	 using	 as	 dependent	 variable	 the	
increase	in	fragmentation	between	that	year	and	2008,	which	is	our	base	year.	Besides	
of	this,	we	are	estimating	exactly	the	same	specification	than	before,	including	the	fixed	
effects	 and	 controls	 already	 described.	 All	 the	 coefficients	 are	 very	 close	 to	 zero	 and	
statistically	 insignificant,	 which	 indicates	 that—both	 during	 and	 before	 the	 boom—	
fragmentation	was	 on	 the	 same	 path	 in	municipalities	 that	were	 hit	 by	 small	 and	 by	
large	 unemployment	 shocks	 during	 the	 recession.	 These	 pre‐trend	 placebo	 tests	 are	
displayed	graphically	in	Figure	3.	Each	dot	(line)	shows	the	point	estimate	(confidence	
interval)	of	a	 regression	of	 the	change	 in	 fragmentation	between	each	year	and	2008.	
The	 graph	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 only	 had	 a	 significant	 and	
meaningful	effect	on	fragmentation	in	the	2015	election.		
Notice	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 province	 and	 population	 strata	 fixed	 effects	 is	
crucial	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 the	 pre‐trends	 in	 political	 fragmentation.	These	 fixed	 effects	may	




This	 graph	 does	 show	 evidence	 of	 non‐negligible	 pre‐trends:	 larger	 unemployment	
shocks	 are	 associated	with	 larger	 initial	 values	 of	 fragmentation	 (relative	 to	 its	 2008	
                                                 
15	We	omit	the	coefficients	for	all	control	variables	from	the	table	for	the	sake	of	simplicity,	but	
they	are	available	in	Table	A2.	Most	of	the	socio‐economic	variables	are	statistically	significant	






in	 the	main	 text,	 clearly	 suggesting	 an	 absence	 of	 pre‐trends.	 The	 coefficients	 for	 the	
elections	held	during	the	crisis	are,	however,	a	bit	 less	precisely	estimated	than	when	




Column	 (2)	 also	 includes	 its	 interaction	 with	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 (which	 is	




had	not	experienced	a	corruption	scandal	 in	 the	past.	This	 implies	 that	an	 increase	of	
one	standard	deviation	of	the	unemployment	shock	increased	fragmentation	by	4.2%	of	
a	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 outcome	 variable.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 unemployment	 shock	
increased	 the	 fragmentation	 index	 by	 0.041	 (=0.032+0.009)	 if	 the	 municipality	 had	
been	 exposed	 to	 corruption.	 In	 terms	 of	 standard	 deviations,	 this	 represents	 a	 19%	
effect.	 Thus,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 on	 fragmentation	 is	 around	 four	
times	 larger	 in	places	exposed	to	corruption.	Note	 that	all	pre‐trend	placebo	 tests	are	
close	 to	zero	and	 insignificant,	not	only	 for	 the	unemployment	shock,	but	also	 for	 the	
interaction	term.	These	results	are	represented	graphically	in	Figure	4,	which	plots	the	




The	 results	 in	 Table	 2	 also	 reveal	 that	 corruption	 had	 a	 direct	 impact	 on	
fragmentation.	 The	 coefficient	 on	Corruption	 is	 0.053	 and	 significant	 at	 the	 5%	 level.	
This	 represents	 9.8%	 of	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable.	 Figure	 5	
represents	 graphically	 the	 estimated	 effects	 of	 corruption.	 This	 graph	 also	 reveals	 an	








4.	 In	 Section	 5.4,	 we	 study	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 estimated	 effects	 to	 the	 control	




Effect	on	main	parties	and	on	 the	 incumbent.	 In	Table	3	we	report	 the	effect	of	 the	
unemployment	 shock,	 corruption,	 and	 their	 interaction	 on	 the	 vote	 share	 of	 the	 two	
main	parties	(PSOE	and	PP).		
The	first	two	columns	show	the	effects	on	the	sum	of	votes	for	these	two	parties.	
The	 results	 mirror	 those	 of	 the	 fragmentation	 index.	 Unemployment	 seems	 to	 have	
mildly	reduced	the	vote	for	the	main	parties	in	the	absence	of	corruption,	but	this	effect	
is	not	significant.	However,	 in	 the	presence	of	corruption,	unemployment	significantly	




indicates	a	drop	of	1.2	p.p.,	which	 is	equivalent	 to	12,1%	of	 the	standard	deviation	of	
this	variable.	
The	 next	 four	 columns	 of	 Table	 3	 show	 the	 effects	 for	 the	 two	 main	 parties	
separately.	Notice	 that	 the	PP	was	 the	 incumbent	 in	 this	 election.	What	 is	 striking	 in	
these	results	is	that	the	effects	are	very	similar	in	size	for	both	parties,	suggesting	that	
both	 paid	 a	 price	 for	 taking	 on	 government	 responsibilities	 at	 some	point	 during	 the	
crisis.	Corruption	significantly	reduced	the	vote	shares	of	both	parties.	It	seems	that	the	
unemployment	 shock	 and	 its	 interaction	 also	 did,	 although	 these	 effects	 are	 not	
statistically	significant	at	conventional	levels.	This	indicates	that	the	vote	loss	of	the	that	
party	 that	 was	 the	 incumbent	 (the	 PP)	 did	 not	 represent	 a	 vote	 gain	 for	 the	 main	
opposition	party	 (the	PSOE).	One	explanation	 for	 these	results,	 that	 is	 consistent	with	
the	 increase	 of	 the	 fragmentation	 index,	 is	 that	 these	 votes	 went	 mostly	 to	 the	 new	
parties.	Hence,	 these	results	evidence	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 fragmentation	 is	not	simply	













parties	 benefited	 from	 corruption	 scandals	 affecting	 mainstream	 parties.	 In	 a	
municipality	with	the	mean	unemployment	shock,	corruption	increased	the	vote	share	
of	Podemos’	vote	by	0.79	p.p.,	 and	 that	of	Ciudadanos’	by	0.34	p.p.,	which	 represent	 a	
11.5%	 and	 a	 7.8%	 of	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 these	 variables,	 respectively.	 These	
results	are	consistent	with	what	we	know	about	Podemos	and	Ciudadanos.	Podemos	is	a	
left‐wing	 party	 with	 a	 clear	 anti‐elite	 rhetoric:	 Podemos	 blamed	 the	 elites	 both	 for	
corruption	and	 for	 the	generation	of	 the	crisis	 that	hit	on	 the	 lower	class.	Ciudadanos	
also	had	an	anti‐corruption	agenda,	but	was	a	liberal	reformist	party	and	was	quite	well	
considered	 by	 the	 economic	 elites	 of	 the	 country.	 It	makes	 therefore	 sense	 that	 both	
parties	 reaped	 some	 electoral	 benefits	 out	 of	 the	 corruption	 scandals	 of	 the	 main	
parties,	 but	 it	 also	 makes	 sense	 that	 only	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Podemos	 the	 effects	 of	 the	
unemployment	 shock	and	corruption	 reinforce	each	other.	Clearly,	of	 the	 two	parties,	
the	behavior	of	Podemos	is	the	one	that	is	more	in	line	with	one	of	the	mechanisms	that	
could	 explain	 the	 link	 between	 the	 corruption	 and	 the	 intensity	 of	 economic	
punishment	 at	 the	 polls:	 the	 one	 suggesting	 that	 corruption	 helps	 voters	 attribute	
responsibility	for	the	generation	of	the	crisis	to	the	main	parties.	
Finally,	 we	 do	 not	 find	 significant	 effects	 on	 the	 vote	 for	 old	 (non‐mainstream)	
parties	 or	 on	 turnout.	 All	 parties,	 especially	 Izquierda	 Unida,	 had	 been	 around	 for	 a	
while,	 and	 had	 participated	 in	 coalition	 governments	 (at	 the	 local	 and	 regional	 level)	
with	 mainstream	 parties,	 meaning	 that	 voters	 might	 not	 have	 considered	 them	 as	 a	
genuine	alternative	 to	 the	mainstream	parties.	 In	 the	case	on	 turnout,	 the	coefficients	
for	 the	 unemployment	 shock,	 corruption,	 and	 their	 interaction	 are	 close	 to	 zero	 and	




















fragmentation	 in	 2011.	 Having	 been	 exposed	 to	 a	 corruption	 scandal	 increased	 the	
fragmentation	index	by	0.039	units	in	the	municipality	with	the	average	unemployment	
shock,	i.e.,	an	effect	similar	to	that	on	the	2015	election.	We	do	not	see	any	interaction	
between	 unemployment	 shock	 and	 corruption	 in	 this	 election,	 that	 is,	 no	 matter	
whether	the	municipality	had	been	exposed	to	a	corruption	scandal,	the	unemployment	
shock	 did	 not	 affect	 political	 fragmentation	 in	 this	 election.	 Figure	 A3	 displays	
graphically	 these	 results,	 and	 the	 associated	 pre‐treatment	 placebo	 tests.	We	 can	 see	
that	there	are	also	no	pre‐trends	in	this	specification.	





we	 show	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 incumbent	 (the	 PSOE)	 and	 the	 main	 challenger	 (the	 PP)	
separately.	Both	parties	seem	to	have	been	punished	for	corruption,	but	the	effects	are	
not	 significant.	 Regarding	 the	 unemployment	 shock,	 it	 reduced	 the	 vote	 for	 the	
incumbent	and	 increased	 it	by	a	similar	amount	 for	 the	challenger.	This	suggests	 that	
this	election	followed	a	more	traditional	economic	voting	pattern:	the	votes	lost	by	the	
incumbent	went	to	the	main	opposition	party.	This	in	contrast	with	the	effects	for	2015,	
in	which	 the	vote	 loss	of	 the	 incumbent	 (the	PP	 in	 this	case)	did	not	represent	a	vote	
gain	for	the	main	opposition	party	(the	PSOE).	
5.4	Robustness	checks	
We	 perform	 several	 checks	 to	 assess	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 results.	 First,	 the	 results	
presented	so	far	include	the	full	set	of	covariates	described	in	Section	4.	In	Figure	6,	we	
examine	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 estimated	 effects	 to	 the	 control	 variables,	 by	 adding	
controls	 sequentially	 to	 the	 regressions.	 The	 figure	 plots	 the	 estimated	 effect	 of	 the	
unemployment	shock	on	fragmentation	for	those	municipalities	that	experienced	a	local	
corruption	scandal	in	the	past,	for	those	that	did	not,	and	the	difference	between	them.	
Each	 line	 in	 the	graphs	 correspond	 to	 a	 regression	 that	 controls	 for	 a	different	 set	of	









The	 estimated	 coefficients	 are	 remarkably	 stable	 across	 specifications,	 revealing	 that	
they	do	not	depend	on	which	specific	set	of	controls	is	included.	
Second,	Table	6	reports	the	results	when	we	control	for	changes	brought	about	by	
the	crisis	 that	could	be	correlated	with	unemployment:	 the	changes	 in	housing	prices,	
local	 public	 spending,	 population	 size,	 and	 share	 of	 immigrants	 (all	 measured	 from	
2008	to	2015).	We	introduce	all	these	variables	both	on	their	own	and	interacted	with	




for	 corruption	 scandals	 breaking	out	 during	 the	 crisis	 (2008‐2015)	 (columns	 (2)	 and	
(5))	and	 to	dropping	municipalities	 that	did	not	have	a	corruption	scandal	during	 the	
boom	but	had	it	during	the	crisis	(columns	(3)	and	(6)).	
Fourth,	 Table	 A5	 reports	 the	 results	 when	 we	 allow	 for	 non‐linearities	 in	 the	
unemployment	 effect.	We	present	 results	 using	 three	dummies	 for	 each	 tercile	 of	 the	
unemployment	 shock.	 In	 column	 (2),	 we	 can	 see	 that	 experiencing	 a	 medium‐size	
unemployment	 shock	 (relative	 to	 a	 small	 shock,	 which	 is	 the	 omitted	 category)	
increases	the	fragmentation	index	by	0.056,	while	suffering	from	a	large	shock	does	so	
by	0.100	(significant	at	the	1%	level).	In	column	(4),	we	see	that	there	is	also	a	positive	
                                                 
16	 In	 this	 regression	we	 can	 only	 identify	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 interaction.	 Thus,	we	only	plot	 the	
difference	in	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	growth	on	the	fragmentation	index,	depending	on	
whether	the	municipality	experienced	a	local	corruption	scandal	in	the	past	or	not.	




and	 significant	 interaction	 of	 unemployment	 and	 corruption	 under	 a	 non‐linear	
specification.		
Fifth,	 Tables	 A6	 and	 A7	 report	 the	 results	 obtained	 with	 different	 samples	






indicate	 that	 unemployment	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 LLM	 mildly	 increased	 fragmentation.	
Corruption	in	the	rest	of	the	LLM	does	not	have	an	effect	on	fragmentation.	One	possible	
interpretation	is	that	individuals	are	more	directly	affected	by	corruption	that	happens	
in	 their	 own	 municipality	 and	 use	 corruption	 in	 neighboring	 municipalities	 as	 a	





In	 this	 paper,	 we	 investigate	 whether	 corruption	 amplifies	 the	 political	 effects	 of	
economic	crises.	Through	a	difference‐in‐difference	analysis	using	municipal‐level	data	
from	Spain,	we	do	 find	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 this	 hypothesis.	Our	 analysis	 shows,	 first,	
                                                 
18 There	are	two	reasons	why	individuals	may	be	more	affected	or	outraged	by	corruption	that	
happens	 in	 their	own	municipality:	 the	corrupt	politicians	are	 those	 that	 they	have	elected	at	









We	 find	 similar	 effects	 when	 we	 look	 at	 the	 effect	 on	 the	 vote	 for	 the	 two	
mainstream	parties	combined.	In	the	case	of	the	new	parties,	the	strongest	effects	are	on	
Podemos,	 the	 left‐wing	 party	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 protest	movements	 of	 the	 15‐M.	
Although	 Ciudadanos,	 a	 liberal	 reformist	 party	 that	 was	 quite	 successful	 in	 the	 2015	
elections,	also	reaped	some	benefits	out	of	the	corruption	scandals	affecting	mainstream	
parties,	only	for	Podemos	did	corruption	clearly	amplify	the	effect	of	the	unemployment	
shock.	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 corruption	 helped	 voters	 to	 attribute	
responsibility	of	the	generation	of	the	crisis	to	the	political	elites	of	the	country.	
In	 sum,	 our	 paper	 shows	 that	 previous	 misbehavior	 of	 politicians	 amplifies	 the	




An	 interesting	 avenue	 for	 future	 research	 is	 to	 study	 what	 factors	 (e.g.	 the	 electoral	
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de	 Investigaciones	 Sociológicas	 (CIS).	 Share	 of	 respondents	







Notes:	 %Unemployed	 =	 #Unemployed	 over	 working	 age	
population;	 Fragmentation	 =	 ‘Effective	 number	 of	 parties’.	















Notes:	 (1)	The	dependent	variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	Fragmentation	 from	
2008	to	the	year	 indicated	in	the	x‐axis.	(2)	Corruption	=dummy	equal	to	















Notes:	 (1)	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	
Fragmentation	from	2008	to	the	year	indicated	in	the	x‐axis.	(2)	
Corruption	 =	 dummy	 equal	 to	 one	 if	 the	 municipality	 has	
experienced	at	 least	 one	 corruption	 scandal	 affecting	 either	 the	
PP	or	the	PSOE	from	1999	to	2007;	%Unemployed	=	Increase	in	
the	 unemployment	 rate	 during	 the	 crisis	 (2008‐2015).	 (3)	 The	
sample	and	control	variables	are	the	same	as	in	Table	2.	(4)	S.e.	














Notes:	(1)	The	dependent	variable	 is	the	 increase	in	Fragmentation	 from	2008	to	2015.	
(2)	Corruption	 =	 dummy	 equal	 to	 one	 if	 the	municipality	 has	 experienced	 at	 least	 one	
corruption	 scandal	 affecting	 either	 the	 PP	 or	 the	 PSOE	 from	 1999	 to	 2007;	
%Unemployed	=	increase	in	the	unemployment	rate	during	the	crisis	(2008‐2015).	(3)	
Controls	 included	 in	 the	different	regressions:	1)	provincial	and	population	strata	 fixed	
effects;	 2)	 controls	 in	 1)	 +	 Political	 variables	 in	 the	 base	 year	 (2008)	 (fragmentation	
index,	turnout,	parties’	votes	shares);	3)	controls	in	2)	+	Socio‐demographics	controls	at	
the	 base	 year	 (mean	 age	 of	 the	 population,	 percentages	 of	 educated	 people,	 share	 of	
immigrants);	4)	controls	in	3)	+	economic	controls	at	t0	(unemployment	rate,	municipal	
expenditure,	 housing	 prices);	 5)	 controls	 in	 4)	 +	 historical	 political	 variables	
(fragmentation,	 volatility,	 ideology	 and	 turnout);	 6)	 controls	 in	 5)	 +	 Interaction	 of	
%Unem.	 with	 the	 historical	 political	 variables;	 7)	 controls	 in	 4)	 +	 Interaction	 of	









	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
	 	 Pre‐trend	analysis	











R2	 0.785	 0.648	 0.563	 0.559	 0.457	
Notes:	 (1)	 Sample=Spanish	 municipalities	 with	 more	 than	 1,000	 residents	 in	 2008,	 excluding	
Catalonia	 and	 the	 Basque	 Country;	 N=2228.	 (2)	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	
Fragmentation	from	2008	to	2015.	Fragmentation	=	‘Effective	Number	of	Parties’,	computed	with	the	













	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 	 Pre‐trend	analysis	



































R2	 0.787	 0.790	 0.648	 0.563	 0.559	 0.457	
















































R2	 0.852	 0.853	 0.878	 0.878	 0.761	 0.761	
Notes:	 (1)	The	dependent	variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	 the	vote	share	of	 the	main	parties;	%Vote	Main	Parties	 is	 the	






		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
%	Vote	New	Parties	 %	Vote	Old	Parties	 %	Turnout	


















































































0.000	 0.000	 ‐0.005	 ‐0.219***	 0.214***	























































R2	 0.786	 0.803	 0.791	 0.796	 0.808	
Observations	 2,149	 2,021	 2,228	 2,228	 1,952	
ΔHousing	Prices	 YES	 NO	 NO	 NO	 YES	
ΔPublic	Spending	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	 YES	
Δ%Immigrants	 NO	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	
ΔPopulation	 NO	 NO	 NO	 YES	 YES	
Notes:	 (1)	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	 Fragmentation	 from	 2008	 to	 2015	 (2).	 See	
notes	in	Table	1	for	the	definition	of	the	sample,	the	controls	included	in	the	regressions,	and	the	s.e.	

















Notes:	 (1)	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	
Fragmentation	 from	2008	 to	 the	year	 indicated	 in	 the	 x‐axis.	










Notes:	 (1)	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	
Fragmentation	from	2008	to	the	year	indicated	in	the	x‐
axis.	 (2)	 %Unemployed	 =	 Increase	 in	 the	
unemployment	 rate	 during	 the	 crisis	 (2008‐2015).	 (3)	
The	 control	 variables	 are	 province	 and	 population	









Notes:	 (1)	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	
Fragmentation	 from	2008	 to	 the	 year	 indicated	 in	 the	 x‐axis.	
(2)	 %Unemployed	 =	 Increase	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate	
during	 the	 crisis	 (2008‐2011);	Corruption	 =	 dummy	 equal	 to	
one	if	the	municipality	has	experienced	at	least	one	corruption	
scandal	affecting	either	the	PP	or	the	PSOE	from	1999	to	2007.	
(3)	 Panel	 i)	 corresponds	 to	 equation	 (1);	 Panels	 ii)	 and	 iii)	
correspond	 to	 equation	 (2).	 (4)	 The	 control	 variables	 and	






Mean	 Min	 Max	 S.D.	 Obs.	
a)	2015	Election	
ΔFragmentation		 1.342 ‐0.597 2.736 0.539	 2228
Δ%Vote	Main	Parties	 ‐25.885 ‐50.737 8.551 10.353	 2228
Δ%Vote		PP	 ‐9.159 ‐29.316 20.170 7.426	 2228
Δ%Vote	PSOE	 ‐16.726 ‐35.079 3.224 5.858	 2228
Δ%Vote	Podemos	 16.196 2.894 41.940 6.835	 2228
Δ%Vote	Ciudadanos	 11.154 0.861 31.745 4.855	 2228
Δ%Vote	Izquierda	Unida	 0.763 ‐22.699 13.127 2.071	 1983
Δ%Turnout	 ‐4.407 ‐18.974 34.160 3.321	 2228
b)	2011	Election	
ΔFragmentation	 0.234 ‐1.275 1.876 0.335	 2228
Δ%Vote	Main	 ‐6.546 ‐33.422 18.935 5.989	 2228
Δ%Vote	PSOE	 ‐13.011 ‐31.433 8.096 3.834	 2228
Δ%	Vote	PP	 6.465 ‐14.737 30.358 5.011	 2228
c)	Treatments	
%Unemployed	(2015‐2008)	 5.938 ‐2.024 19.881 2.504	 2228
%Unemployed	(2011‐2008)	 5.103 ‐3.480 14.071 2.134	 2228
Corruption	 0.158 0.000 1.000 0.365	 2228
d)	Socio‐demographics	controls	
Mean	age	(2008)	 42.668 30.887 59.359 4.805	 2228
%College	educated	(2001)	 34.260 9.380 66.400 8.429	 2228
%Immigrants	(2008)	 8.446 0.000 76.936 8.991	 2228
e)	Economics	controls	
%Unemployed	(2008)	 5.445 0.300 16.200 2.235	 2228
Local	spending	p.c.	(2009)	 0.765 0.008 114.729 2.433	 2228
Housing	prices	(2008)  1.361 0.116 4.385 0.557	 2228
f)	Base‐year	political	controls	
Fragmentation	(2008)	 2.265 1.334 3.517 0.292	 2228
%Vote	PSOE	(2008)	 46.444 8.432 85.636 10.889	 2228
%Vote	PP	(2008)	 44.535 7.461 86.034 11.416	 2228
%Vote	Izquierda	Unida	(2008)	 3.337 0.000 55.361 3.965	 2228
%Vote	Regional	Parties	(2008)	 1.939 0.000 50.000 5.764	 2228



































































































R2	 0.785	 0.787	 0.790	
Notes:	(1)	The	dependent	variable	is	the	increase	in	Fragmentation	from	2008	to	2015.	



















R2	 0.780	 0.797	 0.785	 0.790	 0.799	
Observations	 2,149	 2,021	 2,228	 2,228	 1,952	
Δ	Housing	Prices	 YES	 NO	 NO	 NO	 YES	
Δ	Local	spending		 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	 YES	
Δ	%Immigrants	 NO	 NO	 YES	 NO	 YES	










		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
%	Unemployed	Corruption	































R2	 0.787	 0.787	 0.790	 0.790	 0.790	 0.792	
Observations	 2,228	 2,228	 2,093	 2,228	 2,228	 2,093	
Control	for	Corrup.(crisis)	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	 YES	 NO	
Drop	Corruption	(crisis)	 NO	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	 YES	
Notes:	(1)	The	dependent	variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	Fragmentation	 from	2008	to	2015	(2).	Columns	(2)	
and	(5)	control	for	the	corruption	scandals	reported	during	the	crisis,	and	(5)	also	for	the	interaction	with	
%Unemployed.	Columns	(3)	and	(6)	drop	municipalities	that	did	not	have	a	corruption	scandal	during	the	












































R2	 0.785	 0.786	 0.790	 0.790	
Notes:	 (1)	The	dependent	variable	 is	 the	 increase	 in	Fragmentation	 from	2008	 to	2015.	 (2)	
%Unemployed(High)	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 equal	 to	 one	 the	 unemployment	 shock	 that	
municipality	 i	experienced	during	the	crisis	is	in	the	first	tercile	of	the	unemployment	shock	
distribution;	 %Unemployed(Med)	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 equal	 to	 one	 the	 unemployment	



































































R2	 0.790	 0.784	 0.756	 0.754	
Observations	 2,228	 4,026	 2,150	 2,198	






















































R2	 0.790	 0.791	 0.777	 0.781	 0.724	


































rest	 of	 municipalities	 in	 the	 same	 Local	 Labor	 Market.	 Local	 Labor	 Markets	
defined	 following	 Boix	 and	 Galletto	 (2004).	 (3)	 See	 notes	 in	 Table	 1	 for	 the	
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